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Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion
in Germany*
John H. Langbeint
Among the major western legal systems, the West German is unique
in its concern with controlling prosecutorial discretion. The Germans
have isolated the elements of the problem, and they have implemented
legislation to limit prosecutorial discretion and, indeed, to exclude it
altogether in the most important cases. The German and American
systems of criminal procedure differ in fundamental matters of prin-
ciple and structure, and these differences restrict the direct transfer-
ability of insights and practices between the two. Nevertheless, there are
also important similarities, especially in the pretrial powers and re-
sponsibilities of the prosecutorial office. Americans in search of solu-
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tions for our own complex problem of prosecutorial discretion should
be aware of the German model.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MONOPOLY
What we call prosecutorial discretion arises from the public prose-
cutor's power of nonprosecution. No society would tolerate a rule of
compulsory prosecution so relentless that the prosecutor were required
to institute criminal proceedings in every case, no matter how weak
the incriminating evidence. The prosecutor, or the policeman who
often stands in his shoes, must have the power to evaluate the evidence
in advance of instituting trial. If he is convinced that a suspect's con-
duct did not violate the criminal law or that the evidence cannot per-
suade the court of the suspect's guilt, he serves the social interest by not
wasting resources on a frivolous criminal trial and by not subjecting.
the defendant to its many discomforts. The prosecutor, being mortal,
may err in his exercise of this power of nonprosecution. He may mis-
interpret the law, he may misevaluate the cogency of the evidence. That
is a routine hazard of decision making. It does not call into doubt
the wisdom of allowing the prosecutor to decide.
The prosecutor's power of nonprosecution becomes controversial
when it extends beyond the power to discard hopeless cases. Prosecutor-
ial discretion, as we shall be using the term, means the power to de-
cline to prosecute in cases of provable criminal liability. It is the prose-
cutor's power to select among cases, indeed among like cases, those he
shall press and those not. The public officer responsible for law en-
forcement is permitted to ,pick and choose which laws he will enforce
and against which violators.
What makes this problem of prosecutorial discretion so acute in
American practice is that our prosecutor has a monopoly over the
criminal process. In cases of serious crime he alone procures the indict-
ment or lays the information; and thereafter, his powers to dismiss, to
compromise, or to insist on full trial are all but unlimited. No other
officer and no private citizen, not even the victim, may come forward
to prosecute when the public prosecutor will not. No one else may
make good the prosecutor's neglect.
The omnipotence of the public prosecutor in American procedure
is a sharp divergence from the common law model. In England private
prosecution continues in theory to be the norm. Official prosecution is
formally limited to the handful of cases brought by the Director of
Public Prosecutions. "When 'the police' prosecute, the correct analysis
is that some individual has instituted proceedings, and the fact that this
individual is a police officer does not alter the nature of the prosecu-
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tion."' Although public officials prosecute almost all cases, they do so
in the guise of private citizens. It follows that private citizens not in
uniform can (and do2) prosecute even cases of serious crime.
From a quite different starting point, the classical Continental crimi-
nal procedural system, the French, has also avoided creating a prose-
cutorial monopoly. Although the prosecutorial corps normally com-
mands the formal public prosecution, l'action publique,3 private prose-
cution under the rubric of l'action civile has acquired a significant
sphere. The primary function of l'action civile is to permit the victim
of a crime to constitute himself partie civile and to join a claim for
civil damages to the public prosecutor's action for criminal sanctions. 4
If the public prosecutor does not initiate l'action publique, the partie
civile may do it himself," ostensibly in order to provide the necessary
basis for his parasitic damages claim. What in fact results is akin to
private prosecution. The use of this procedure has grown enormously
in the present century on account of what Americans would call a relax-
ation of standing requirements. Trade unions, policemen's associations,
and numerous other juristic persons have been allowed to deem them-
1 R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE AN ENGLAND 155 (6th ed. 1972). For historical
background, see Kurland & Waters, Public Prosecutions in England, 1854-79: An Essay in
English Legislative History, 1959 DuE L.J. 493; Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecu-
tion at Common Law, 17 AM. J. .EAL H=Ss. 313 (1973).
2 For example, the highly publicized prosecution by Francis Bennion against Peter
Hain, chairman of the Young Liberals, who was convicted at jury trial on August 21,
1972, of conspiracy to hinder and disrupt a Davis Cup tennis match at Bristol in 1969. The
case arose out of protest demonstrations against White South African teams appearing at
sporting contests in Britain. After the verdict the Guardian editorialized:
The private prosecution can be a useful procedure in that it allows the police to
step out of a case involving minor assault between neighbours, for example, but still
alow the aggrieved neighbours recourse to the law if they desire it.... There is a
safeguard, but it failed to operate in the Hain trial. The DPP has the power to take
over a private prosecution, and then to decide whether a case should proceed.
Unfortunately he did not act in this way in the Ham case. It would seem desirable
that where the Director has decided there is no cause for prosecution in a case as
serious as conspiracy, he should exercise his power to take over the prosecution.
Guardian (London), Aug. 22, 1972, at 10. These suggestions that private prosecution be
limited to petty domestic affrays and that the public prosecutor's decision not to prosecute
in serious cases be final would bring the English practice close to the German. See text
and notes at notes 57-66 infra. [I am grateful to David Fleming and Peter Wallington of
the Law Faculty of Cambridge University for supplying me with newspaper clippings of
the Hain proceedings.]
3 C. PRO. PLN. art. 31: "The public prosecutor (ministgre public) shall conduct public
prosecutions (l'action publique) and procure the application of the law."
4 Id. art. 2: "Those who have personally suffered harm resulting directly from a
[crime] are entitled to l'action civile to recover damages ......
5 Id. art. 1: "L'action publique ... may also be initiated by the injured party, under
the conditions established in the present code." Id. art. 85: "Anyone claiming to be
injured by a [crime] may constitute himself a partie civile by lodging a complaint with
the competent [court]."
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selves "victims" of crimes committed against their members.
6 Conse-
quently, when the French prosecutor decides not to prosecute, he
decides for himself and his office alone. Someone else may still invoke
the criminal process against the culprit.
Although the Germans derived a good deal of their criminal proce-
dure code in the nineteenth century from the French, they did not in-
troduce a variant of l'action civile (known as the Adhisionsverfahren)
until the 1940s. The procedure is seldom used for civil damage claims
proper,7 and it cannot be used as in France to enable the victim (how-
ever defined) to institute the criminal case. If the German prosecutor
has determined not to prosecute, the victim can bring his civil action
only in tort. He is not entitled to launch a private prosecution. In
Germany, with insignificant exceptions discussed below, the public
prosecutor has a monopoly over the criminal process. The German law
is a compelling object of comparative study for Americans, because the
German prosecutor, like the American, is a monopolist.
The prosecutor's monopoly is explicitly created and protected by
statute in Germany. The Code of Criminal Procedure8 sets it forth in
two consecutive sections:
151. The opening of a judicial investigation [meaning primar-
ily the commencement of a "trial" (Hauptverhandlung)] is condi-
tioned upon the preferring of a formal charge (Klage).
152(1). The public prosecutor is responsible for preferring
the ... formal charge.
These two code sections are regarded as expressing fundamental prin-
ciples that have distinctive names in the literature. Section 151 is
called the Anklagegrundsatz, roughly, the principle of the formal crim-
inal charge. It was designed to constrain the inquisitorial judge of
earlier centuries, who had been empowered to conduct the entire crimi-
nal process, from the gathering of first suspicions to final adjudication
and sentencing. The Anklagegrundsatz bifurcates the criminal process
and restricts the modem German court to the second stage. The court
cannot take proofs and adjudicate. until a preliminary investigation
0 See A. Beth, Die Geltendmachung zivilrechtlicher Schadensersatzansprriche im
franz6sischen Strafverfahren 32-51 (dis., Freiburg 1972).
7 For a convenient explanation of the stillbirth of this device, see Jescheck, Die
Entschddigung des Verletzten nach deutschem Strafrecht, 13 JUlUSTENUzEITUNG 591 (1958).
8 STRAFrROZ5SSORDNUNG [hereinafter cited as Code of Criminal Procedure]. The Code
sections governing prosecutorial discretion were recently discussed in Jescheck, The Dis-
cretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 Am. J. CoMe. L. 508
(1970). For a concise but now somewhat outdated English language account of the Ger-
man procedure, see Wolff, Criminal justice in Germany, 42 Mxcii. L. Rxv. 1067 (1944), 43
Mcir. L. REv. 155 (1944).
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procedure (Vorverfahren) has been completed, culminating in a formal,
written criminal charge (variously: Klage, Anklage or Anklageschrift)
setting forth a prima fade case against the accused.9
According to section 152(l), the preferring of this formal charge is
the responsibility of the public prosecutor. German writers speak of his
Anklagemonopol, his monopoly over the preferring of the charge.
Criminal sanctions are imposed for public purposes. German law takes
the position that only the state, through a specially constituted officer,
should have the power to institute the process leading to those sanc-
tions.
What the Germans have largely done, and the Americans largely not
done, is to devise means to regulate the prosecutor's monopoly. The
kernel of the German scheme is set out, in immediate juxtaposition to
the prosecutor's Anklagemonopol, as the second half of section 152 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure:
152(2). [The public prosecutor] is required ... to take action
against all judicially punishable.., acts, to the extent that there is
a sufficient factual basis.
This is the celebrated Legalitiitsprinzip of German law (literally, the
legality principle; better, the rule of compulsory prosecution). The Ger-
mans have undertaken to forbid their monopolist prosecutor the dis-
cretion to refuse to prosecute in cases where adequate incriminating
evidence is at hand. This rule, together with its limitations and excep-
tions and the citizen's remedies to enforce it, is the subject of this
study.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PROSEcuTORIAL DISCRETION
The contrast between the American and German law of prosecutorial
discretion is sharp and invites the question of how it has come about.
American law received and developed a great common law tradition
of hostility to monopoly in the marketplace, and it has characteristically
insisted upon limiting and checking governmental powers of every
kind. How is it that Americans have managed to place one of the most
dangerous of all governmental powers beyond review or control, in the
hands of a nearly omnipotent prosecutor? And how is it that the
Germans, whose record of controlling governmental powers has not
always been distinguished, have been so alert to controlling the prose-
cutor?
The common law's concept of the prosecutorial function formed over
centuries of predominantly private or citizen prosecution. Official or
9 See Code of Criminal Procedure § 200.
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public prosecution initially developed as an adjunct to private prose-
cution and was steeped in the forms of private prosecution, as it con-
tinues to be in England today. Those forms helped conceal the develop-
ment of the professional public prosecutor in America. By the time the
American prosecutor's monopoly could be perceived, new factors were
operating that seemed to require expansive prosecutorial discretion-
the changes in the law of criminal procedure and evidence that brought
about the need for plea bargaining.
The office of the public prosecutor at common law developed within
an inherited system of citizen prosecution. Throughout the Middle
Ages prosecution had been left to the victim, kin, or others, who would
get their story to the juries of accusation and of trial. In the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, the local justices of the peace (JPs) were given
some organizational responsibilities over citizen prosecution. When
cases of serious crime were reported to the JPs, they were empowered
to order pretrial detention of the suspect and to "bind over" the victim
and other witnesses to prosecute-to require them to appear before the
two juries on penalty of a fine for nonappearance. Lawyers were not
then regularly employed in the conduct of the criminal trial, either
for the crown or the defense. The trial judge called the witnesses, and
the proceeding transpired as a relatively unstructured "altercation"'
01
between the witnesses and the accused. The JP's prosecutorial role was
mainly passive, binding over citizen prosecutors to trial. In a difficult
case, however, it began to be expected that the JP would investigate on
his own to discover and bind over witnesses. More exceptionally, he
might continue on to exercise some forensic prosecutorial role at the
trial itself-interrogating witnesses and arguing the case to the jurors.1
The public prosecutor at common law thus grew up in the shoes of
the old citizen prosecutor, occasionally displacing or supplementing
him, but more usually deferring to him. Absent professional police and
professional lawyer-prosecutors, the decision whether to prosecute was
still in the main left to the initiative of the victim. Hence, when pro-
fessional police and their criminal counsel developed in the nineteenth
century, they acceded to a role that the English still characterize as that
of the private citizen.
Professional prosecution by lawyer-officers developed earlier in Amer-
ica than in England.1 However, American colonial and state practice
10 Sm THoMAs SMrrH, DE REP'UBLICA ANGLORUM 80 (1583 ed.) (bk. 2, ch. 23).
11 For detailed discussion of the English history, see J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CrIsE
IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 34-54 (1974); Langbein, supra note 1.
12 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECU-
TION 6-7 (1968) [Wickersham Comm'n Rept. No. 4]; Comment, The District Attorney-A
Historical Puzzle, 1952 Wisc. L. REv. 125.
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took from the English JP system the notion that public prosecution was
a local function, not hierarchically subordinated to the direction of the
attorney general. American populism then transformed the prosecutor
(along with some judges and various other local officers) into an elective
officer. This reinforced the inherited pattern of discretionary prosecu-
tion. The prosecutor acquired the elective officeholder's authority to
conduct the affairs of his office so as to win electoral approval.
Further, the survival of the grand jury in many American jurisdic-
tions, including the federal system where the elective principle was not
admitted, has ever worked to conceal the extent of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. The formal criminal charge is made to issue in the name of a
panel of citizen accusers, but this grand jury is in truth the prosecutor's
rubber stamp. It seldom refuses to indict when he insists, and still less
does it exercise its theoretical power to present or indict on its own
initiative. The grand jury only appears to interpose a discretion of its
own. Yet the appearance has surely helped to isolate arbitrary prosecu-
torial practices from public resentment and reform.
More than any other factor, however, what has brought about and
sustained prosecutorial discretion in America in its present dimension
has been the steady accretion of evidentiary and procedural safeguards
for the accused which has transformed jury trial and made the
system of plea bargaining essential.
Jury trial in early modern times was a summary proceeding. A single
assize judge could process dozens of felony trials in a single day. In the
seventeenth century a criminal trial jury would be impaneled and
hear evidence.in six or seven unrelated cases before retiring to formu-
late verdicts in all. 13 The law of criminal evidence was primitive into
the eighteenth century, the right to representation by counsel was not
generalized to all felonies until the nineteenth century, and appellate
review was very restricted into the twentieth century.14 The practices
that so protract modern American jury trial-extended voir dire, exclu-
sionary rules and other evidentiary barriers, motions designed to pre-
serve appellate issues, maneuvers and speeches of counsel-all are late
13 The mechanics of multiple trials to the same jury are described in THE OFFICE OF
CLERK OF AssIZE 12-16 (1676 ed.). The clerk should make a list of prisoners and their
offenses; then "when the Jury is ready to go from the Bar, he delivereth it unto them for
their better direction and help of their memory to know who they have in charge." Id.
at 15.
14 See T. PLUCKNErTT, A CONCiSE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 213, 434-35 (5th ed.
1956); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CMmINAL LAw OF EtqcLAND 308-18 (1883); Wigmore,
A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, in 2 SELacr EssAys IN ANGLO-
AMERIcAN LEGAL HISTORY 691, 692-97 (1908). The sixth amendment guaranteed the right
to counsel half a century before the English statute of 6 &c 7 Wil IV, c. 114 (1837).
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growths in the long history of common law criminal procedure. They
have, however, made jury trial unworkable as a routine procedure for
our burgeoning criminality and have led to the system of nontrial
disposition that exists in well over 90 percent of felony cases. The
system as now practiced depends on the prosecutor's exclusive authority
to grant concessions in order to induce waivers of the right to jury trial.
Thus it came about that the American prosecutor fell heir to his
unregulated monopoly. He stands in the shoes of an ancient citizen
prosecutor. His power is often concealed by the archaic grand jury.
Outside the federal system he is an elective local potentate, liberated
from hierarchical control on account of being subject to theoretical
review by ballot. And in our century the transformation of jury trial
has forced him to erect a new procedural system, plea bargaining, on
the basis of his power of nonprosecution.
III. THE GERMAN PROSECUTOR
The modern German rule of compulsory prosecution is also a crea-
ture of history, born in the middle of the nineteenth century together
with the office of the public prosecutor. Prior to that time, the prose-
cutorial function had been merged in the all-encompassing work of the
inquisitorial judge, who both investigated alleged or suspected crime
and then adjudicated on the basis of his own investigation. By the early
nineteenth century the view had become widespread that this combina-
tion of functions prejudiced the accused. "Only a judge equipped with
superhuman capabilities could keep himself in his decisional function
free from the suggestive influences of his own instigating and investi-
gating activity."'15
The prosecutorial office (Staatsanwaltschaft) was established as a
reform, to improve the procedural lot of the accused. The responsibility
for investigation on report or suspicion of crime was split from the
judicial office and made the job of the public prosecutor.
A. Criminal Procedure
The preliminary procedure (Vorverfahren) conducted by the prose-
cutor culminates with his decision either to drop the case for want of
adequate factual basis or to prefer the formal criminal charge. This
written charge summarizes the prima facie case against the accused
* and names the witnesses and any other evidence by which the charge
may be substantiated. According to the Anklagegrundsatz of section
15 E. SCHmiDT, LEHRKO MmENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG uND GERICHTsVERFASSUNGSGESTIZ
(TEL I) 197 (2d ed. 1964).
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151, only after the charge is filed may the court proceed to judicial
investigation and adjudication.
Criminal procedure is still "inquisitorial" in the sense that the
court 6 is itself responsible for establishing the true facts, once the
prosecutor has seised it of the case by preferring the formal charge.17
Although the prosecutor and defense lawyer may ask questions at the
trial, the procedure is fundamentally nonadversarial. It is the presiding
judge who interrogates the witnesses and the accused. The proofs of-
fered by the prosecution and the defense do not bind the court, which
may call additional witnesses. (The official file built up by the police
and the prosecutor goes over to the court when the charge is preferred,
giving the court a basis for arranging the sequence of witnesses at trial
and ordering additional proofs.) The court is not bound by a defen-
dant's confession; it interrogates the accusing witnesses in order to
satisfy itself of the man's guilt, despite the confession. The prosecutor
loses control over the case once he has preferred the formal charge.
He is not free to drop the case without judicial consent. Nor is the court
bound by the prosecutor's theory of the case; if the prosecutor's charge
characterizes the events as burglary, the court may still convict the ac-
cused of armed robbery.'8
German courts are composed of professional judges and laymen who
sit and decide together.' 9 The Germans do not have to contend with
guiding and controlling our panel of lay jurors who formulate a ver-
dict without the participation of professional jurists and who render it
without stating reasons. Consequently, the German law of evidence is
relaxed; standards of admissibility are broad, and most of the common
law exclusionary rules, such as the prohibition of hearsay, are un-
known. The Germans have also felt no urge to devise exclusionary
rules of evidence20 to deter abuse of powers by the police and the
prosecutorial corps. German police and prosecutors are professionals,
hierarchically organized and controlled from the state level and subject
16 For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to distinguish among the half
dozen criminal trial courts in which the number of judges varies according to the gravity
of the offense. For a description of these courts, see Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the
German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL Sumrs 135, 141-43 (1972).
17 Code of Criminal Procedure § 244(2); ef. id. § 155(2).
18 Id. § 155. The accused must be notified of the court's reformulation of the criminal
liability, and he must be given an opportunity to respond in his defense. Id. § 265(1).
19 Except the lowest court, the Amtsgericht, in which a single professional judge sits
alone in petty matters.
20 Except, of course, for tortured and similarly coerced confessions. Code of Criminal
Procedure § 136a; cf. id. §§ 250-52. See generally Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Con.
viction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
506 (1973).
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to effective administrative and judicial review and discipline upon
citizen complaint.
Because the law of evidence is uncomplicated and the proof-taking
is largely conducted by the presiding judge, the prosecutor cuts a
peripheral figure at trial. He interposes occasional questions and he
makes a concluding statement to the court following the proof-taking
in which he comments on the evidence and proposes a sentence should
the court find the accused guilty. (Defense counsel usually does a
little more questioning of witnesses at trial, but he too is customarily
a relatively passive forensic performer.) In my own experience observ-
ing German trials I have never seen the legendary sleeping prosecutor,
but I have seen a prosecutor reading a novel while the court conducted
the proofs.
Although in his trial role the German prosecutor bears little resem-
blance to the forensic combatant of Anglo-American procedure, his
pretrial functions are similar. He investigates (when the police have
not given him a completed case) and he decides whether to prefer
charges. It is this phase of his work which the Legalitiitsprinzip regu-
lates by insisting that he prefer charges whenever the pretrial investi-
gation furnishes sufficient factual basis.
B. The Logic of Compulsory Prosecution
The rule of compulsory prosecution has been operating as long as
the prosecutor himself. The prosecutor was called into existence in a
unique act of creation in the middle of the nineteenth century in order
to remove the work of pretrial investigation from the hands of the
formerly all-powerful inquisitorial judge. Some of the best minds of
a great juristic age, including Savigny, as Prussian minister of justice,
participated in constructing and defining the prosecutorial office. In
contrast to the unplanned parentage of the Anglo-American prosecutor,
the German prosecutor was conceived with considerable forethought
about his duties and powers.
German writers investigated the English pattern of private prosecu-
tion, but feared that it might invite an even greater abuse than the
prosecutorial bias of the procedure they were trying to reform.21 The
partisanship of a contest between private hunter and hunted seemed
to them scant improvement. Their solution, therefore, was to retain
and entrench the public monopoly over the criminal process, but to
divide it between two main officials. The prosecutor would investigate
and charge, the judge would conduct the proofs and adjudicate.
21 K. ELLiNG, DiE EiNFOHRUNG DER STANTSANWALTSCHAFr xN DEUTSCHLAND 30 ff. (1911).
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The German prosecutor's office was being created to relieve the
German courts of responsibility for the preliminary investigation, in
order to enhance the impartiality of the courts' adjudicative work. Yet
it was feared that this separation might actually worsen the position of
the accused by subjecting him to the excessive zeal of a professional
prosecutor. Savigny sought to prevent the prosecutor's office from ac-
quiring such a cast by vesting it with a continuing judicial character.
The prosecutor was, after all, receiving duties and powers detached
from the former office of judge. To retain a judge-like impartiality
for the prosecutor, the Code of Criminal Procedure has from the outset
required him to gather "not only inculpating but also exculpating evi-
dence ... .,22 Further, if the prosecutor believes that the trial court has
erred to the detriment of the accused, for example, by setting too severe
a sentence, he may appeal to a higher court on behalf of the accused.23
Hence, in his role as leader of the pretrial investigation and in his role
as public litigant to enforce the law, he is invested with the duty and
the power to be impartial. In Savigny's famous phrase, the prosecutor
is to be the "watchman of the law,"24 as evenhanded an officer of en-
forcement as could be devised.
Savigny's conception of the prosecutorial office gave it a curious
"double character" 2 as both an executive and a judicial office. The
Germans were led to articulate the Legalitiitsprinzip, the rule of com-
pulsory prosecution, in the course of designing this hybrid. They
wanted a hierarchically organized prosecutorial corps, with a chief
prosecutor for each judicial district in charge of allocating and review-
ing the work of his subordinates, and himself subject to review and
direction by a prosecutor general and by the state minister of justice.26
This system allows an orderly meritocratic career pattern for members
of the prosecutorial corps. It permits a unitary interpretation of the
law to be propounded for the whole state; and, in cases in which the
22 Code of Criminal Procedure § 160(2).
23 Id. § 296(2).
24 Quoted in E. SCHMIDT, EINFUHRUNG IN Din GEsC CHTE DER DEUTSCHEN STRaaHcsrs-
,rFLEE 331 (3d ed. 1965).
25 K. PomEts, STRAFPRozEss 139 (2d ed. 1966).
26 GEucHTsv AssuNGSoaEs §§ 143-47. Although West Germany has a unitary national
code of criminal procedure, law enforcement and the administration of justice are orga-
nized at the state level. Bavaria, Hessee, and so forth each has a ministry of justice
directing the prosecutorial corps, and an interior ministry responsible for the police. How-
ever, those of the police who are put at the disposal of the prosecutor for investigatorial
work are by statute made subject to his control. Id. § 152. There is a federal prosecutorial
office, the Bundesanwaltschaft, but with very limited subject matter jurisdiction. See
E. KmtN & C. RoxiN, STRAFvERuAIENSRECHT 41-42 (11th ed. 1972).
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Legalitdtsprinzip does not apply,27 it permits rulemaking to guide pro-
secutorial discretion.
A bureaucratic prosecutorial corps subordinated to the minister of
justice (a political officer of the state government) could be subjected
to political pressure to abuse its considerable powers of prosecution and
nonprosecution. The German rule of compulsory prosecution was de-
signed to prevent that pressure. The German prosecutor who, for ex-
ample, is ordered by his minister not to prosecute in a case of political
corruption must disobey the order. Section 152(2) requires him to
prosecute, and failure to do so is itself criminal.28 Hence, although the
rule of compulsory prosecution limits the power of the prosecutor, it is
also a fundamental protection for him. It is the basis of the judicial
character of his office, the source of his freedom from improper inter-
ference from above.
This two-sided nature of Legalitiitsprinzip is easy for Americans to
overlook, because we -are so accustomed to a non-hierarchical prosecu-
torial structure. Although our federal system does have some points of
resemblance to the German organization, the state prosecutorial sys-
tems are balkanized. Elected county prosecutors are not subject to
effective higher authority, and the United States Attorneys enjoy con-
siderable autonomy. The German system, on the other hand, gives the
prosecutor a real interest in seeing to it that the rule of compulsory
prosecution is adhered to. For although the rule can be enforced against
him, it also shields him.
To summarize: The German prosecutor's monopoly over the formal
criminal process was intentionally built into his office. The rule of com-
pulsory prosecution appeared simultaneously, both to rid the monopoly
of its dangers for the citizen and to protect the prosecutor from political
intervention. The dual function of the rule mirrors the dual character
of the German prosecutor's office: he is obliged to perform an executive
function according to judicial standards of conduct. The rule of com-
pulsory prosecution frees him from demands for partiality from within
the executive, while opening him to demands for impartiality from
without.
IV. Tim SCOPE OF COMPULSORY PROSECUTION
How can the Germans prosecute every jaywalker? They cannot and
they do not. In fact, most punishable conduct falls outside the rule of
compulsory prosecution and is selectively prosecuted. Nevertheless, for
27 See text and notes at notes 48-58 infra.
28 See K. PEraS, supra note 25, at 142.
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serious crime the rule retains its full vigor. Legalitiitsprinzip has been
steadily eroded in the twentieth century, but only for lesser crimes
and infractions. Consequently, the rule itself needs to be understood
in light of its exceptions.
A. Petty Infractions
Prosecutorial discretion is largely a resource question. American plea
bargaining occurs because we lack sufficient prosecutorial and judicial
resources to provide a full jury trial for every defendant entitled to it.
The criminal process does not seem to have a high claim on resources.
Critics have long pointed out that these resource limitations have been
aggravated by so-called overcriminalization. The available enforcement
resources have to be spread over a wide variety of proscribed conduct,
which creates pressures for selective enforcement. There is hardly a
serious American writer on criminal law today who does not urge de-
criminalization of a number of acts, typically victimless crimes whose
proscription merely reflects moral indignation instead of more sub-
stantial public interests.
The decision to decriminalize prostitution or pornography, for ex-
ample, means that conduct previously punishable shall no longer be.
Decriminalization has, however, a second and less fashionable mean-
ing, exemplified in German criminal justice: removal from the criminal
process of conduct that nevertheless continues to be proscribed and
punished. Since World War II the law has undergone a series of major
revisions designed to eliminate from the criminal process almost all
traffic violations and the bulk of economic and other public regulatory
activity. The offenses remain, but they are conceptualized differ-
ently and subjected to different procedures.
Petty infractions were formerly called Ubertretungen, translatable as
lesser misdemeanors. They have now been rechristened Ordnungs-
widrigkeiten (literally, violations of order; better, petty infractions),
and are regulated under a separate procedural code.29 The procedure
for processing petty infractions has four important characteristics:
(1) administrative officers, primarily the police, handle these cases with-
out the participation of the public prosecutor or the criminal courts;
(2) the process is conducted wholly in writing, and there is no trial
unless the citizen elects to contest the case in the criminal court; (3)
the sanctions as well as the infractions are both narrowed and relabelled
to avoid criminal stigma; and (4) the rule of compulsory prosecution
does not apply.
29 The code is the 1968 GEsmZ fBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEMN [hereinafter cited as Petty
Infractions Code], which replaced the 1952 code of the same name.
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The traffic police, board of public health, or other relevant enforce-
ment agency carries out the procedure without calling on the public
prosecutor. The agency conducts a preliminary investigation, which
usually amounts to no more than the policeman's observation of the
speeding car, but which can involve formal questioning of a suspected
violator and witnesses.30 When the agency is persuaded that its investi-
gation has established a violation, it issues a Bussgeldbescheid, a "pen-
ance money" decree. The decree orders the citizen to pay a certain
sum, between 5 and 1,000 marks, unless a higher sum is prescribed by
the substantive law being enforced.31 (In traffic cases the state ministries
have worked out by rule a tariff for the various infractions and aggra-
vating factors.) The decree instructs the citizen that it becomes final
unless he files an objection with the local criminal court within one
week. If he does object, the administrative agency gives the file to the
public prosecutor, a trial is set, and the case is processed according to
the ordinary course, that is, under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The decision to criminalize is, therefore, made by the citizen. If he
does not contest the decree he must pay up, but he will not be put
through the criminal process. It needs to be emphasized that this alter-
native procedure is no mere labelling trick, Etikettenschwindel.2 To
be sure, there is an element of simple relabelling in insisting on calling
the penalty "penance money" rather than "fine" (Geldstrafe). However,
important consequences differ depending on whether conduct is char-
acterized as a crime or a petty infraction. First, penance money is not
reckoned as a criminal sanction for purposes of criminal record-keeping.
Second, in the event of nonpayment, the penance money decree may
not be enforced by means of imprisonment. If the citizen refuses to pay,
the authorities proceed by "administrative execution,"3 3 which can be
described in Anglo-American terminology as a set of summary modes
of civil execution.
Finally, section 47 of the Petty Infractions Code provides: "The
prosecution of petty infractions is remitted to the duty-bound discre-
tion of the prosecuting authorities." The administrators who "prose-
cute" such cases are not bound by the rule of compulsory prosecution
applicable to the offenses still labelled "criminal" and prosecuted by
the public prosecutor.
This exclusion is thought to follow from the underlying theory of
separating crimes from petty infractions. German writers have at-
30 Id. § 55.
31 Id. § 13. (The mark is currently worth about 40 American cents.)
32 E. KERN & C. Roxxv, supra note 26, at 338.
83 Petty Infractions Code § 90.
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tempted to find both qualitative and quantitative distinctions between
the categories. In the qualitative sense, it has been argued that petty
infractions are generally morally colorless, mala prohibita. They "have
no social-ethical content or [they] may in any event be placed outside
social-ethical consideration." 34 This notion reflects the view3 5 that the
essence of the criminal process is the moral condemnation attaching to
its formal sanctions and its procedures. As government regulation has
multiplied the number of petty prohibitions, it has cheapened the
moral force of the criminal sanction. The Ordnungswidrigkeit proce-
dure, by decriminalizing the morally neutral, enhances the distinctive-
ness of what is genuinely criminal. It rehabilitates the criminal sanc-
tion.
This attempt to distinguish Ordnungswidrigkeiten on qualitative
grounds has not been universally accepted. 36 At least when the viola-
tions are intentional, offenses ranging from homicide to jaywalking in
one sense can be regarded as ethically indistinguishable. All are pro-
scribed for social purposes. Any willful violator may be said to offend
substantially identical social interests. The only difference, it is argued,
is quantitative.
The quantitative element is palpable: petty infractions are petty.
They inflict a lesser quantum of social harm, and they are more lightly
punished in all legal systems. When the penalty is minor in the absolute
sense, and when it has been designed to avoid criminal stigma, the metic-
ulous fact-finding and other safeguards of ordinary criminal procedure
are excessive to the purpose. A short-form procedure will suffice.
The discretion of the enforcement authorities in such cases may
then be subsumed under general administrative discretion. Although
the authorities exercise a prosecutorial role, they are not judicial offi-
cers in the same sense that the public prosecutor is. The public prose-
cutor who avenges murders and robberies lacks discretion because every
murder and robbery needs to be prosecuted. The community is entitled
to retribution, the offender requires reformation, and maximum prose-
cution promotes maximum deterrence. Those imperatives are thought
not to carry over to petty infractions, which are prosecuted merely
when expedient, as a means of keeping order. The legislature is rela-
tively indifferent to the details of how the administration keeps order,
the precise mix of disciplinary and other steps. Highway safety is pro-
moted not only by disciplining speeders, but by redesigning roadways.
34 K. PLrTrs, supra note 25, at 31.
85 Also contended in the best common law thinking. See Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
86 See J. KRUM.ELMANN, Dm BAcATELLDELIKTE (1966).
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The water supply is protected both by improving drainage canals and
by punishing the owners of defective septic tanks.
The drawback in allowing the administrative authorities this dis-
cretion to enforce petty infractions according to their convenience is
the danger that they will use the power capriciously or for improper
ends. In Germany this prospect has troubled hardly anyone. The police
and most other authorities are hierarchically organized from the state
level. Not only are they well led and controlled, they are liable to
serious departmental and judicial review for abuse of authority.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of the Ordnungswidrigkeit procedure
that remind an American of plea bargaining. There is an inducement
to the citizen not to contest the penance money decree, because if he
does contest, he will be assessed costs if he loses at the subsequent trial.
Yet this incentive inheres in any procedural system, civil or criminal,
that both permits default judgments and charges the costs of nondefault
proceedings to the loser. The crucial point in the German system is
that the sanction itself-the amount of the penance money-is not
systematically increased when the citizen demands a trial. It is true
that the public prosecutor who then takes the case to trial is not bound
by the precise sum proposed by the administrators in the rejected
penance money decree. But this is because the Germans think it fun-
damental that the judge-like prosecutor ought never to propose a
sentence to the court until he has heard all the evidence at trial. Like
the court, the prosecutor must not prejudge the case. Systematically
recommending a higher penalty in order to deter citizens from claiming
their right to trial in petty infraction cases would be improper, and has
not in fact occurred.
The inducement of a lesser penalty in exchange for waiver of defen-
sive rights does exist, however, in the so-called warning procedure,
which is a short-form version of this already short-form Ordnungswid-
rigkeit procedure. Section 56 of the Petty Infractions Code provides:
(1) In cases of minor (geringfilgig) petty infractions, the admin-
istrative authorities can issue a warning to the person involved
and exact a warning payment (Verwarnungsgeld) from 2 to 20
Marks. They should impose such a warning [i.e., require payment]
when a warning without warning payment is insufficient.
(2) The warning according to the first sentence of subparagraph
(1) is operative only if the person agrees to it after being instructed
of his right to refuse [and then pays promptly] ....
(4) When the warning... is operative, the act may no longer
be prosecuted as a petty infraction.
The practical importance of this procedure is for the most minor
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traffic violations. Parking tickets and citations for lesser moving viola-
tions are generally styled as "warnings" coupled with a demand for a
"warning payment." The state ministries have promulgated tariffs for
warning payments, fixing the amounts by rule, a practice that the Code
expressly authorizes them to undertake.37 The warning payment is
smaller than the penance money would be for the same infraction. The
citizen is therefore invited to pay a lesser sum and have the infraction
characterized by a still less opprobrious label, in exchange for conced-
ing the liability and paying the penalty within a short time. The proce-
dure can be oral and immediate: a traffic policeman may exact a pay-
ment on the spot (for which he must issue an official receipt). The ad-
ministration is thereby spared the paperwork even of the regular petty
infraction procedure.
The warning procedure does invite the citizen to waive defensive
rights in exchange for a lesser penalty-it might be said that he is
asked to "cop a plea." The procedure, however, applies only to the
pettiest of petty infractions, cases where the penalties are insignificant
and the stigma from suffering public discipline is least.
B. Strafbefehl: The German Guilty Plea
For the remainder of this paper we shall be examining the ways the
Germans process offenses that they do regard as "criminal." These of-
fenses were formerly divided into three categories-Verbrechen, Ver-
gehen, and Ubertretungen,3 translatable for present purposes as felo-
nies, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors. The last category is now
being abolished; most of these offenses are being turned into petty in-
fractions or abolished outright; a few are being upgraded into misde-
meanors. By 1975 German law will recognize only two categories-
felonies and those misdemeanors that survive decriminalization. Sec-
tion 1 of the Penal Code defines a felony as any crime for which the
Code stipulates a minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment. In
this paper we shall be speaking as though the 1975 law were now in
force, in order to avoid discussing the disappearing Ubertretungen.
The procedure we have discussed above that invites default or con-
sent to pay penance money for petty infractions was created in imita-
tion of the so-called Strafbefehl ("penal order") procedure of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. 9 This too is an entirely written procedure,
without trial or other appearance of the accused before a court or an
87 Petty Infractions Code § 58.
88 Corresponding generally to the French crimes, ddlits, and contraventions.
89 Code of Criminal Procedure §§ 407-12. For the text of a model Strafbeflhl, see K.
MARQuARDT, STRA0RoZSS 114 (2d ed. 1970).
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officer. It applies solely to Vergehen, the surviving misdemeanors. It is
conducted by the public prosecutor and is a mode of prosecution. For
example, in a shoplifting case, when the police transmit the file to the
prosecutor, he may elect to prosecute the case through the penal order
procedure, instead of moving for formal trial. He is likely to do so
when the facts appear to be uncontested or uncontestable, for example,
when the shoplifter was apprehended in the act and thereafter con-
fessed to the police.
The prosecutor moves in the local criminal court for the issuance
of the penal order. The prosecutor drafts the proposed order, and in
theory the judge reviews the file and the order before propounding the
order as his own. In practice this review is generally cursory, and the
order customarily contains what the prosecutor has proposed. The
order has the form of a provisional judgment issued by the court:
"Unless you object by such-and-such date, you are hereby sentenced to
such-and-such criminal sanction(s) on account of such-and-such conduct
which offends such-and-such criminal proscription(s)." The document
instructs the accused that if he makes timely objection (within one
week) -he is entitled to a criminal trial. If he objects, the penal order
is nugatory and an ordinary criminal trial will take place as though
the penal order had never been issued.
The penal order procedure is normally used when the prosecutor
seeks a sanction less severe than imprisonment, typically a fine. Under
present law, however, he may propose by penal order a sentence of up
to three months imprisonment. This provision has been criticized on
the ground that imprisonment is so serious that it should not be im-
posed unless the court faces the man it sentences and hears whatever
he has to say.40 A statutory revision of the penal order procedure ex-
pected to come into effect in 1975 or 1976 will limit it principally to
cases in which the prosecutor demands a fine or a suspension of driver's
license, and will exclude imprisonment.41 Unlike the penance money
of the petty infraction procedure, however, these penalties are criminal
sanctions and are entered on the citizen's criminal record.
The similarity between the German penal order and the Anglo-
American guilty plea is manifest: the prosecution invites the accused
to waive any defenses and consent to the punishment propounded by
the prosecution. 42 There are, however, important differences.
40 K. PErTERS, supra note 25, at 491.
41 ENTWUPR EINES EINFHRUNGSQESETZES ZUM STRAFGESErUCH (April 1972) [hereinafter
EGSTGB] Code of Criminal Procedure] § 407.
42 See Jescheck, supra note 8, at 515-16. The analogy to the distinctively American nolo
contendere plea is even more apt. The prosecutor induces the waiver of jury trial by
permitting the defendant to concede criminal liability under a less opprobrious label.
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First, the penal order procedure applies only to misdemeanors, and
even there only when relatively light sanction are proposed. The
really troubling arena of the American guilty plea is the plea bargain-
ing in felony cases, where the accused barters his right to jury trial for
a lighter sanction. Because our right to jury trial does not extend to
petty crimes,43 plea bargaining in those cases is scant-the accused has
no chips. The real parallel to the German penal order procedure is
the short-form American citation practice for traffic offenses: "Pay this
fine or appear in court" (variant: "Post bond and forfeit it for default
on nonappearance").
Second, the German penal order might be said to invite a plea, but
not a bargain. The prosecutor evaluates the case, persuades himself of
the accused's guilt, and recommends a sentence. The judge passes upon
the recommendation and issues the provisional judgment. The accused
is not represented and does not participate in this process. He is offered
the sentence on take-it-or-leave-it terms. The procedure lacks the horse-
trading quality of American plea bargaining (which so offends German
notions of how criminal sanctions ought to be determined).44
Third and most important, the penal order does not offer a lesser
sanction in exchange for the guilty plea. The accused who objects to
the order, demands trial, and loses is not likely to receive a stiffer sen-
tence. Technically, a stiffer sentence could follow because the pro-
visional sentence in the penal order does not estop the prosecutor from
urging, or the court from imposing a higher sentence.45 It is a funda-
mental rule of German criminal procedure46 that the prosecutor may
not formulate his demand for sentence until he has heard all the evi-
dence. It is open to the prosecutor to take the position that the case
appears more serious after trial than when he proposed the rejected
penal order, and accordingly urge a higher sentence. He would, how-
ever, have to substantiate that view in order to persuade the court. In
practice an increase in the recommended penalty does not seem to
happen with any regularity. Hence, what the accused primarily risks
in rejecting the penal order is not a greater sentence, but court costs
and the notoriety of public trial. Such inducements to waive defenses,
43 Baldwin v. New York, 899 U.S. 66 (1970).
44 Plea bargaining is all but incomprehensible to the Germans, whose ordinary dis-
positive procedure is workable without such evasions. In the German press the judicial
procedure surrounding the resignation of Vice President Agnew was viewed with the
sort of wonder normally inspired by reports of the customs of primitive tribes. "The
resignation occurred as part of a 'cow-trade,' as it can only in the United States be
imagined." Badische Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1973, at 8, col. 2.
45 Code of Criminal Procedure § 411(8).
46 Already noted with regard to the petty infraction procedure. See text at p. 454 supra.
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while not inconsiderable, are not comparable to the lesser sentence that
the American prosecutor offers in his plea bargaining.
We need to emphasize that the penal order procedure is fully con-
sistent with the rule of compulsory prosecution. The procedure is sim-
ply a mode of prosecution. It spares everyone the inconvenience of a
trial for open-and-shut cases. An enormous proportion of German crimi-
nal prosecutions take place in the penal order format.47 For the same
reasons that most Americans do not care to go to court to contest
speeding tickets, most Germans caught shoplifting do not want to go
to court to contest that either.
C. Opportunitiitsprinzip: Explicit Prosecutorial Discretion
The German rule of compulsory prosecution, section 152(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, is sharply limited by the counterprinciple,
discretionary nonprosecution, set forth in sections 153-154. The coun-
terprinciple is known as Opportunitdtsprinzip, the principle of expe-
diency or advisability. Save for a few exceptions of no quantitative
significance,48 the scheme of discretionary prosecution applies only to
misdemeanors. It has steadily expanded during this century. The basic
provision is section 153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, set out here
in the slightly revised version expected to come into force in 1975 or
1976. In a case of misdemeanor
the public prosecutor may refrain from prosecuting with the con-
47 Earlier statistics suggest figures as high as 70 percent. See, e.g., Jescheck, supra
note 8, at 516. See also J. HERRMANN, Dm REXORM DER DEVTSOHEN HAUPTVERHANDLUNG
NACH DESS VORBILD DES ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN STRAFVERFAHRENS 164 n.77 (1971). These
figures include traffic offenses that are now being decriminalized as Ordnungswidrigkeiten;
hence the present proportion of offenses handled by penal order is probably lower. (I
owe this point to Professor Mirjan Damaska, University of Pennsylvania Law School.)
48 A few discretionary provisions do extend to felonies:
(1) Cases of treason, espionage and the like are exempt from the rules of compul-
sory prosecution, mainly to allow spy-swapping and other political settlements. Code
of Criminal Procedure §§ 153b, 153c, 153d, 154b; renumbered in EGSTGB as §§ 153c,
153d, 153e, 154b. See Schram, The Obligation to Prosecute in West Germany, 17 Am.
J. CoMP. L. 627 (1969).
(2) The prosecutor may decline (with judicial approval) to prosecute at all in cer-
tain cases in which the court could, on account of the strength of mitigating factors,
impose no penalty whatever on the felony offender after convicting him. Code of
Criminal Procedure § 153a; renumbered in EGSTGB as § 153b.
(3) When an offender has committed a series of offenses, the prosecutor need not
prosecute the minor ones. Code of Criminal Procedure § 154. For example, property
damage incident to a bank robbery need not be prosecuted, but the robbery itself
must be.
(4) When an offender is blackmailed because of a past crime and reports the black-
mail, the prosecutor is authorized to decline to prosecute him for his crime. Code of
Criminal Procedure § 154c.
The justifications for discretion in these few situations are obvious: Case 1 arises out of
international political necessity. Cases 2 and 3 conserve prosecutorial resources from
manifest waste. Case 4 permits the prosecutor to excuse the small fry in order to induce
him to turn in a more serious offender.
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sent of the court competent [to try the case], if the guilt of the
actor would be regarded as minor (gering), and there is no public
interest in prosecuting.49
The legislature thus authorizes nonprosecution, but subject to ex-
press standards. The prosecutor may decline to prosecute only when
he is persuaded that the suspect's guilt is minor and the public interest
would not be served by prosecuting. His determination requires judi-
cial approval. Although theoretically the court can prevent the prose-
cutor from contravening conventional standards of interpretation of
minor guilt and absence of public interest, in practice judicial ap-
proval is a mere formality. The court has no better information than
the prosecutor (the official police and prosecutor's file).
In the literature this system of discretionary nonprosecution of mis-
demeanors is regarded as arising out of the same policies that led to
decriminalization and discretionary nonprosecution of petty infrac-
tions. If the rule of compulsory prosecution were strictly applied, the
growth of new categories of minor crime in the statutes and the in-
crease of reported crimes of all types would submerge the prosecution
of serious crime in a sea of less important cases. 50 In effect, section 153
provides criteria of selection in a situation where the resources to
prosecute every crime are not at hand. The system: prosecute virtually
every felony, and prosecute the more important misdemeanors accord-
ing to the standards of gravity in section 153.
Through their rule-making authority, the ministries of justice of
all the German states have propounded a code of Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure.5 Rule 83 attempts some further particularization
of the standards of section 153. For example, to evaluate the degree of
guilt of an offender, the prosecutor should compare the particular of-
fense with other cases of the same crime in order to see whether the
conduct ranks among the less serious of the genre. In addition, the
public interest requires prosecution for frequently committed offenses,
which show a stronger need for deterrence [shoplifting, for example];
nonprosecution of some such offenders, says the regulation, would ap-
pear to be arbitrary. Further, if the offender has been previously
warned or punished for similar conduct, there is a public interest that
he now be prosecuted. 52
49 EGSTGB: Code of Criminal Procedure § 153.
50 See E. ScHMIDT, supra note 15, at 219-21.
51 Richtlinien flr das Strafverfahren (1970) [hereinafter, Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure]. For text see T. KLEINKNECHT, STRAPROZESSORDUNG 1525 ff. (31st. ed. 1974).
52 The operation in daily prosecutorial practice of section 153 and its regulatory gloss
has been described for English speaking readers in Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory
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By far the most controversial of the ministerially approved standards
for nonprosecution under section 153 has been a provision53 authoriz-
ing prosecutors to treat the offender's conduct after the offense as
relevant to the degree of his guilt, for example, when the offender re-
stores property, compensates the victim, or volunteers to make a pay-
ment to a charitable organization in atonement for his conduct. Such
conditional nonprosecution has been criticized in Germany,54 because
it does constitute a form of plea bargaining, and without any statutory
basis. The offender or his lawyer haggles with the prosecutor, offering
to waive judicial proceedings and accept a lesser "sanction" in exchange
for lighter treatment (nonprosecution). Nevertheless, the revision stat-
ute expected to come into force in 1975 or 1976 expressly legitimates
the use of such conditions, ostensibly to provide a basis for nonprosecu-
tion under the standards of section 153 (minor guilt, absence of public
interest).5 5 Professor Herrmann's study concludes that the scheme of
conditional nonprosecution has until now been used mostly, although
not exclusively, for traffic and other relatively trivial misdemeanors.5 6
The revision legislation, however, does not limit the types of misde-
meanor that may be handled in this way.
It is easy to see why this procedure appeals to both prosecutor and
offender. As with the penal order mode of prosecution for misde-
meanor, this mode of nonprosecution saves the prosecutor's and the
court's time. The case does not go to trial. The offender saves the time
and costs of trial. Much more important to him, he is spared the stigma
of criminal conviction when he is allowed to settle the case by paying
off the victim or making a charitable contribution. Similar arrange-
ments have developed in American practice,57 but without any articu-
lated doctrinal standards like the minor guilt and lack-of-public-interest
criteria of section 153.
The parallel between the short-form penal order prosecution and
the conditional nonprosecution is worth stressing. Both are limited to
misdemeanors--crimes of lesser social importance. Both reduce dras-
tically the prosecutorial resources that must be devoted to such cases.
These practices, by lightening the load of the prosecutor in cases of
Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
468 (1974).
53 Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure 83.
54 See 1 LWE-R oSENBERG, Dm STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGS-
GFsE~z: GROSSKOMMENTAR § 153 Ann. 17 (22d ed. 1971); Schmidhiiuser, Freikaufverfahren
mit Strafcharakter im Strafprozess?, 28 JURISTENZEITUNG 529 (1973).
55 EGSTGB: Code of Criminal Procedure § 153a.
56 Herrmann, supra note 52, at 489-93.
5T See F. ML _.ta, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRImE
260-80 (1969).
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lesser crime, bring it about that the rule of compulsory prosecution in
cases of serious crime is not frustrated for want of resources.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the ministries of justice have
been able to regulate section 153 by rule precisely because section 153
is the counterprinciple to the rule of compulsory prosecution, the rule
which protects the prosecutors from ministerial interference. Where
that rule does not apply, the ministries can bind the prosecutorial corps
to the ministerial interpretation." On the other hand, the significance
of the ministries' rules ought not to be exaggerated. They are few and
dense, and have added little to the two concepts of the statute itself-
minor guilt and lack of public interest. Perhaps the relativity of both
concepts makes either inherently difficult to particularize further by
rule.
V. ENFORCING THE RULE OF COMPULSORY
PROSECUTION
The public prosecutor is duty-bound to prosecute virtually all felo-
nies and all misdemeanors that he cannot excuse under section 153 for
minor guilt and lack of public interest. But what if he refuses to do
his duty? What if, owing to corruption or to excess of compassion or
to error, a member of the prosecutorial corps neglects to prosecute
in a case in which the law demands it? And what if the case escapes the
notice of his superiors in the normal course of intra-office review and
discussion of cases, either through his deviousness or because it does
not sufficiently stand out from the routine?
It is the prosecutorial monopoly that makes this such an extremely
important question, because other officers or private citizens cannot
come forward to take up the neglected prosecution. There are two
ways to prevent the abuse of a monopoly-break it or regulate it. The
prosecutor's monopoly would be broken if citizen prosecution were
allowed as in England or France. But German law, we have seen, insists
on the public monopoly of the criminal process for all but a handful of
cases about to be discussed. The main German approach, therefore, has
been to regulate the prosecutor's monopoly by giving citizens the right
to departmental and judicial review of decisions not to prosecute.
A. Citizen Prosecution
For a narrow class of misdemeanors, mostly designed to protect pri-
vate dignitary and property interests, German law does allow private
prosecution. Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists eight
such misdemeanors: trespass to domestic premises, insult, inflicting
58 E. ScHMWT, supra note 15, at 225.
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minor bodily injury, threatening to commit a crime upon another, un-
authorized opening of a sealed letter or document, infficting property
damage, patent and copyright violation, and crimes proscribed by the
unfair competition statute.
If the prosecutor exercises his discretion under section 153 to refuse
to prosecute one of these misdemeanors, the victim may still prosecute.
Citizen prosecution is not conditioned upon the public prosecutor's
refusal to act,6 9 as it is in France. The citizen may prosecute without
having first demanded public prosecution. However, the public pros-
ecutor may decide at any time to prefer the public criminal charge,
should he form the view that it is "in the public interest" to do so. 0
If the public prosecutor does act, he takes over the primary responsibil-
ity for the case. The private prosecutor becomes a Nebenkiager, what
we might call an intervenor with a watching brief."1 He still has the
major rights of a party: to have witnesses called, to appear by counsel,
to put questions at trial, to propose a judgment to the court, and to
appeal against an unfavorable result.0 2
Predictably, German law frowns on private prosecution even in this
peripheral sphere. The court may dismiss the case on what we would
call the pleadings, either for legal insufficiency or when it deems the
defendant's guilt minor (gering).3 There is also a strike suit provision,
requiring the private prosecutor to provide surety for the accused's
costs, and to make advance payment of court costs which will be forfeit
if he loses. 4 If the case concerns any of the dignitary, as opposed to the
proprietary, misdemeanors, the private citizen may not prefer criminal
charges before attempting out-of-court reconciliation in a proceeding
conducted by a state agency. 5 Only the victim66 can prosecute; and
German law, unlike French, has kept this standing requirement nar-
rowly defined.67
Despite these limitations, private prosecution does diminish the sig-
nificance of the power of the public prosecutor under section 153 to de-
cline to prosecute these misdemeanors. Even if the prosecutor finds the
59 Code of Criminal Procedure § 374(l).
60 Id. § 376.
61 See id. §§ 377, 395.
62 Id. §§ 374, 584, 586, 390.
63 Id. § 383(2). One of the standards that governs the public prosecutor's decision
not to prosecute misdemeanors under section 153 may thus reappear to defeat private
prosecution in these special cases. The other standard of section 153, public interest, is
implicitly suspended by the legislature's decision to allow private suits.
64 Id. §§ 379, 379a.
65 Id. § 380.
66 Id. § 374(l).
67 1 LwE-RosaENBaG, supra note 54, § 172 Anm. 7-8.
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requisite public interest to be lacking, the victim may still prosecute
out of private interest.
We have been speaking of the victim's right to prosecute in these
special cases either alone or as Nebenkidger alongside the public prose-
cutor. For most of these misdemeanors, and for a few others, the victim
is also empowered to veto the public prosecutor's decision to prosecute.
The misdemeanors subject to this right are called Antragsdelikte, liter-
ally, demand offenses, crimes that the prosecutor may not pursue with-
out a formal demand from the victim. The offenses consist mainly of
intra-family trespasses (excluding the very serious ones such as incest),
where criminal sanctions may do more harm than good; and minor
injuries to property, person, and dignity, where the public interest is
comparatively slight and prosecution is warranted only if the victim is
sufficiently disturbed to desire that criminal sanctions be invoked.
68
These procedures for private prosecution and for private veto of
public prosecution apply to only limited categories of lesser offenses.
They therefore have not had a major place in the German system. In
general, the Germans have retained the public prosecutor's monopoly
of the criminal process and have given the victim procedural rights
that regulate rather than break the monopoly.
B. Mandamusing the Prosecutor
German law provides citizens with rights to administrative and judi-
cial review of prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute. Not all citizens
may claim these rights, and not all nonprosecution decisions are sub-
ject to them. Where they do apply, however, these remedies constitute
significant controls over and deterrents against abuse of prosecutorial
authority.
The statutory procedure bears the name Klageerzwingungsverfahren,
literally, the proceeding to compel the (preferring of the formal crimi-
nal) charge. We can render it in Anglo-American terminology as a
mandamus action for a judicial decree to require the prosecutor to
prosecute-an action that common law courts will not entertain.
Anyone is entitled to make a formal demand to the prosecutor, ask-
ing him to prosecute in a particular case. 9 If the prosecutor still de-
clines to prosecute, he must notify the complainant of this decision, and
explain the reasons. When the complainant was the victim of the crime
and reported it, the prosecutor's notice must also instruct him of his
right to seek departmental and judicial review.70
68 See Maiwald, Die Beteiligung des Verletzten am Strafverfahren, 1970 GOLTDAmmER'S
ARCHIV FUR STmRARrcHr 33, 34.
69 Code of Criminal Procedure § 158(1).
70 Id. § 171.
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Only the victim may bring the mandamus action. He must first file
a formal departmental complaint with the state prosecutor general.
If it is rejected, he is entitled to sue. The complainant must be repre-
sented by counsel in bringing the mandamus action, but public aid may
be available to defray these costs.7 1 If he loses, he must pay costs, and
he can be forced to post security. The state supreme court (Oberlandes-
gericht) has original jurisdiction in these cases, in which a mainly writ-
ten procedure is prescribed. The victim's petition sets forth the facts
that support his view and describes the putative proofs. The court may
then demand to see the prosecutor's files; it may ask the accused to re-
ply, indeed, it must do so before approving the petition; it may conduct
its own proofs (for which purpose one of its members is constituted in-
vestigating magistrate). If persuaded that the prosecution is required,
the court orders it to be brought. 72
The scope of this citizen's remedy is sharply restricted by the proviso
that it may not be used to contest nonprosecution when the prosecutor
has invoked section 153 or the forthcoming section 153a-the statutory
scheme of nonprosecution and conditional nonprosecution for misde-
meanors. 73 This limitation is theoretically justified by the existence of
judicial review in such cases, in that the prosecutor's decision under
sections 153 and 153a requires (but routinely receives) judicial consent.
The effect of the limitation, however, is to prevent development of
effective judicial controls and standards for the most active area of non-
prosecution. Doubtless the real justification is the same as for the stat-
utory scheme of nonprosecution itself--conservation of prosecutorial
resources, in this case sparing the prosecutor from having to litigate
defensively misdemeanors that he-did not think important enough to
press offensively.
The mandamus remedy is thus only as broad as the rule of com-
pulsory prosecution. It extends to virtually all felonies and to those
misdemeanors that, according to settled departmental practice, the
prosecutor would not include under the lack-of-public-interest rubric
of section 153. The mandamus procedure permits judicial review of the
prosecutor's evaluation under the rule of compulsory prosecution that
he lacked "sufficient factual basis" for proceeding, that is, that there
was no probable cause. "Successful Klageerzwingungsverfahren occur
in practice with the most extreme rarity. Nevertheless, the possibility
of a Klageerzwingung is of great importance, in that it imposes a flat
71 1 L6WE-ROSENBERG, supra note 54, § 172 Anna. 12.
72 Code of Criminal Procedure §§ 172-77.
73 EGSTGB: Code of Criminal Procedure § 172(2).
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rule against improper and illegal considerations."7 4 The rarity results
not only from the somewhat limited range of cases subject to the man-
damus action, but also from the exhaustion requirement. Departmental
complaint precedes judicial review. Every complaint receives a careful
review by the office of the state prosecutor general, and most erroneous
decisions not to prosecute are corrected there rather than in the courts.
The Code provides that where the victim does succeed in manda-
musing the prosecution, he is entitled to participate with the prosecu-
tor as an accusing litigant (Nebenkidger) at the subsequent criminal
trial.75 This safeguard prevents the prosecutor from trying to sabotage
at trial the case that he has been ordered against his will to conduct.
The danger of sabotage, however, is not as great in the German system
as it would be in ours for -two reasons. First, we have seen that once the
German prosecutor has preferred the formal criminal charge, he re-
tains only a secondary responsibility for unearthing further evidence
and presenting the case to the court. The charge seises the court of the
official files of the case, and the active role in ordering further proofs
is the court's. At trial the presiding judge leads the proceedings and in-
terrogates the witnesses.76 The court is not bound by the prosecutor's
submissions; it may disregard his motion to dismiss or the sentence he
proposes in his summation. Once the charge has been preferred, which
is what the mandamus action achieves, the German prosecutor lacks
the capacity for mischief that the common law prosecutor possesses on
account of his forensic primacy at trial. Second, the hierarchical struc-
ture of the German prosecutorial corps must incline superiors to react
to the rebuke of a mandamus against their underlings by transferring
the case to other members of the office or otherwise directing and su-
perintending diligent prosecution.
Any common law variant of judicial review of statutory standards
for nonprosecution would probably have to provide for a special prose-
cutor on remand.
C. Departmental Complaint
Because the mandamus remedy is limited to cases (mostly felonies)
in which the rule of compulsory prosecution applies, it is not available
to the citizen who wishes to challenge the prosecutor's exercise of his
statutory power of nonprosecution for misdemeanor under section 153.
The citizen may, however, lodge a departmental complaint against the
74 K. PE=ERs, supra note 25, at 464-65.
75 Code of Criminal Procedure § 395(2).
76 Including the accused and experts, whom the Germans do not label as witnesses.
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prosecutor's decision. This so-called Dienstaufsichtbeschwerde is not
provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It derives from the
principle of German administrative law that the citizen is entitled to
file a complaint against a public employee's neglect of duty or abuse of
power. The employee, in this case in the prosecutorial corps, will have
to answer to his superior regarding the complaint, and the superior will
have to pass upon the appropriateness of his conduct.
In practice, this nonstatutory complaint system is administered in
the same manner as departmental review of the victim's complaint in
cases in which the victim may thereafter resort to the statutory manda-
mus remedy. The state prosecutor general receives the complaint (it is
forwarded to him even if lodged locally). The prosecutor's file on the
case is sent up to the prosecutor general, together with the written
response of the local office whose decision not to prosecute is being chal-
lenged. The prosecutor general decides whether to sustain or overrule
the decision not to prosecute. He notifies the citizen of the disposition
of the complaint, but does not state reasons. The citizen may appeal
an unfavorable ruling to the state minister of justice, but not to the
courts.
What makes this remedy effective is the hierarchical structure of the
prosecutorial corps. Prosecuting is a lifetime career, or an integrated
part of a lifetime career, for German prosecutors. They wish to rise
within the prosecutorial hierarchy or, as is usual in most German states,
to transfer to the judiciary. Where transfer between the prosecutorial
and the judicial corps is usual, it is also encouraged: no judge can
aspire to the highest judicial office without a period of service as a pros-
ecutor. Promotion of judges and prosecutors is meritocratic, based on
internal review of individual performance. Prosecutors do not want
citizen complaints, particularly successful complaints, on their records.
Hence, German legal academics tend to believe that the risk of a
Dienstaufsichtbeschwerde is a greater deterrent to prosecutorial mal-
practice than the possibility of the mandamus action.
CONCLUSION
Major and indelible differences distinguish German and American
criminal procedure. The fundamentally different trial procedure in-
evitably affects the pretrial process. The paternalistic notion of the
bureaucratic German prosecutor as watchman of the accused's rights
is still marked with overtones of the older, more authoritarian inquisi-
torial system that it displaced.77 Because German trial procedure is
77 See Roxin, Rechtsstellung und Zukunftsaufgaben der Staatsanwaltschaft, 47 DEuTscHE
RiGicn EIUNG 885 (1969).
[41:439
1974] Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion 467
more rapid and efficient than American procedure, and German crime
rates lower, German law can insist on a full trial for virtually every
felony case. The need for plea bargaining-for nontrial disposition-
is not as urgent in German procedure.
Nevertheless, there are similarities between the German and Ameri-
can systems that make a comparison worthwhile. German procedure is
not so efficient that every offense can be prosecuted. Resource insuffi-
ciency has led German law, like American, to admit the power of non-
prosecution. Both systems have responded by empowering monopolist
prosecutors to select which offenses they will prosecute. Unlike the
Americans, however, the Germans have tried very hard to articulate
and to enforce some criteria of selection that Americans ought to find
at least suggestive.
